Closing Gaps in Co-determination? The BMAS Draft Bill of November 12, 2026, on the SE and the Status Procedure
Standby SEs, Presumptions of Abuse, and Eased Access to the Status Proceedings under Section 98 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG)—An Overview with Analysis under European Law
With the draft bill presented on November 12, 2026, the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (BMAS) aims to regulate two issues related to corporate employee participation:
- the circumvention of employee participation rights through so-called standby Societas Europaea (standby SE) and
- the procedural hurdles in the judicial enforcement of co-determination in status proceedings under Section 98 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG).
Both proposals pursue the same goal but must be assessed very differently from a legal perspective: While the reform of the status proceedings is largely unobjectionable under EU law, the regulation of the Vorrats-SE conflicts with the most recent case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
I. The “Reserve SE” and the “Freeze Effect”
1. Current Situation Under Applicable Law
Unlike with national legal forms, co-determination in an SE is not mandated by law but is primarily determined through negotiations between the management of the founding companies and a special negotiating body (Section 21 of the SE Participation Act (SEBG)). The aim of the SE Participation Act (SEBG) is to safeguard rights already acquired in accordance with the so-called before-and-after principle.
If an SE is established without employees, no participation procedure under Sections 4 et seq. of the SEBG can take place. According to prevailing opinion and case law, the procedure is then dispensable; registration takes place upon submission of a negative declaration by the founders. (Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, Order of March 30, 2009 – 3 Wx 248/08, BeckRS 2009, 10698.)
The admissibility of a standby SE as such is overwhelmingly affirmed. In practice, approximately half of all SE formations in Germany have been carried out as standby formations, frequently as subsidiary SEs under Art. 2(3) of the SE Regulation. (Casper, BeckOGK SE, 19th Edition, SE Regulation Art. 2, para. 27.)
If such an SE is later put into economic operation—that is, if it hires employees or acquires subsidiaries—the so-called freeze effect takes hold: The level of co-determination existing at the time of formation—in this case, the absence of co-determination—remains permanently in effect. This is because, unlike the One-Third Participation Act (DrittelbG) and the Co-Determination Act (MitbestG), the SEBG does not provide for any thresholds above which a supervisory board would have to be formed or composed on a parity basis during ongoing operations. According to the prevailing view to date, a subsequent increase in the number of employees generally does not trigger renegotiation under Section 18(3) of the SEBG; at most, a structural change has been discussed as a trigger. This has given rise to the accusation of “evading co-determination.”
To date, the sole corrective measure has been the general prohibition against abuse under Section 43 of the SEBG: An SE may not be misused to deprive employees of their participation rights or to withhold such rights from them. Abuse is presumed if, within one year of formation, structural changes with this effect occur without following the procedure under Section 18(3) of the SEBG. Violations are currently punishable under Section 45 of the SEBG.
2. The Guidelines Under European Law: The ECJ’s Olympus Ruling
Whether the freeze effect is compatible with EU law has long been a matter of dispute. The Federal Labor Court (BAG) referred the question to the CJEU, which made fundamental findings in its judgment of May 16, 2024 (C-706/22 – Olympus):
- No automatic obligation to retroactively conduct the participation procedure: The SE Directive 2001/86/EC does not impose a general obligation to retroactively conduct the participation procedure if an SE established without employees later employs workers or becomes the parent company of subsidiaries with employees. In principle, a retroactive procedure is only considered in the event of a structural change within the meaning of Section 18(3) of the SEBG.
- Member States’ Discretion in Cases of Abuse: Under Article 11 of the Directive, Member States must prevent the abuse of the SE to deny participation rights; they have broad discretion in determining the specific provisions. A national regulation requiring the retroactive conduct of the negotiation process in cases of abuse is expressly permitted.
- Narrow Limits of the Concept of Abuse: The mere choice of a legal form permitted under EU law or the subsequent organic growth of the workforce does not, in and of itself, constitute abuse. Both an objective and a subjective element are required—the deliberate elimination of existing employee participation and an intent to circumvent the law that must be demonstrated on a case-by-case basis.
The German debate regarding the analogous application of Section 18(3) of the SEBG to new business start-ups (the so-called renegotiation model) is thus largely obsolete under EU law. Furthermore, according to the Nuremberg Regional Labor Court (LAG) and the Federal Labor Court (BAG), the assumption of the general partner position in a limited partnership (KG) by an employee-less SE is not considered a structural change. (Nuremberg Regional Labor Court, Order of September 1, 2022 – 1 TaBV 27/21, BeckRS 2022, 42406; Naber/Sittard, Munich Handbook on Labor Law, 6th ed. 2025, § 384, paras. 111–114.)
The draft does not generally prohibit standby SEs, but aims to overcome the freezing effect through two rebuttable presumptions of abuse:
- First presumption: The SE—alone or together with subsidiaries—employs at least ten employees for the first time without a participation procedure being carried out.
- Second presumption: Within four years of the SE’s formation or after the ten-employee threshold is first reached, changes occur that would normally trigger a higher level of employee participation.
If either presumption applies, the employee participation negotiations must be conducted retroactively. If they fail, the statutory fallback provisions of §§ 34 et seq. SEBG apply. The decisive factor here is not the participation actually practiced, but the participation required by law—that is, the “target state,” not the “actual state.” If there are indications of abuse, the registry courts are to conduct a preventive abuse review prior to any registration and, if abuse is found, refuse the registration. The previous criminal liability under Section 45 of the SEBG is to be replaced by this regime under civil and corporate law.
4. Assessment: A reasonable concern, but significant risks under European law
Objectively understandable, but a break with the existing system. The draft responds to structures that legal scholarship has long described as circumventions—such as the merger of a co-determined entity into a co-determination-free “shelf SE” or the use of such a structure to acquire shares in co-determined companies (the “Daimler-Chrysler model”). (Casper, BeckOGK SE, 19th edition, SE Regulation Art. 2, para. 36; Habersack/Henssler/Höpfner, Right to Co-determination, 5th ed. 2025, SEBG § 43, paras. 10a–11.) The four-year observation period and the ten-employee threshold are based on Section 43, sentence 2, of the SEBG (old version) and on the renegotiation model described in the legal literature. The European Court of Justice has expressly confirmed that the obligation to retroactively conduct the negotiation process is permissible in cases of genuine abuse.
Contradiction with the before-and-after principle. The SE Regulation and the SE Directive protect acquired rights, not dynamic growth; Recital 18 of the Directive explicitly refers to rights existing prior to the formation of the SE. The system specifically does not recognize a right to future, hypothetical co-determination in the event of subsequent growth. A telling comparison can be made with Directive 2003/72/EC on the European Cooperative Society (SCE): Only that directive explicitly provides that, if thresholds are exceeded at a later date, the rights apply as if the threshold had been reached prior to registration—a provision that is deliberately absent from the SE Directive. The draft effectively establishes an obligation to retroactively comply solely based on the number of employees reached, and thus a dynamic obligation to adapt that the European legislature did not intend.
Reversal of the Burden of Proof and Freedom of Establishment. A presumption that takes effect as soon as the threshold of ten employees is first reached shifts the burden of proof onto the companies and also covers cases of organic growth, which, according to the prevailing consensus, do not constitute abuse. Since virtually every operating company quickly exceeds this threshold, the legitimate practice of establishing companies in advance is effectively devalued. This creates a significant risk that the provision will be classified as a disproportionate restriction on the freedom of establishment (Art. 49, 54 TFEU), as it systematically disadvantages the SE compared to national legal forms. Article 12(2) of the SE Regulation will also have to be applied as a benchmark: A refusal of registration based on mere presumption would be unprecedented; under current EU law, the status proceedings under Sections 97 et seq. of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) or the labor court resolution proceedings have thus far provided for subsequent legal protection.
Preclusive effect of Union law. Finally, there is strong evidence that the SE Directive exhaustively regulates the circumstances that trigger an obligation to renegotiate or re-negotiate. A national expansion under the guise of combating abuse—which goes beyond preventing abuse in individual cases and establishes general, threshold-based obligations to renegotiate—could therefore fail due to the harmonizing effect of the Directive. The Commission had already identified the issue of reserve provisions in 2008 but did not resolve it through an amendment to the Directive.
In summary, it can be noted that the draft makes extensive use of the leeway provided by Article 11 of the SE Directive. It thus runs the risk of being viewed by the ECJ as an impermissible correction of the assessment made in the Olympus decision. If the legislature intends to allow for dynamic adaptation, the methodologically sound approach would be to amend the SE Directive itself—as has already been done for the SCE—rather than to rely on a national presumption of abuse. However, this would require a European regulation, not merely a national one.
II. Simplified Judicial Enforcement of Co-determination (Section 98 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG))
1. Background: Status proceedings and the principle of continuity
A change in co-determination status—such as an AG growing into parity-based co-determination under the Co-Determination Act (MitbestG) upon exceeding 2,000 employees—does not occur automatically. The principle of continuity applies: The existing supervisory board remains in office and capable of acting until a formal status proceeding under Sections 97–99 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) has been conducted. This serves to ensure the proper functioning of the corporate bodies and legal certainty.
Disputes regarding the composition of the supervisory board are decided, upon application, by the regional court at the company’s registered office (Section 98(1) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG)). Those entitled to file an application include, among others, the management board, members of the supervisory board, qualified works council bodies, one-tenth or 100 employees eligible to vote, as well as umbrella organizations and labor unions, provided they are entitled to a right of nomination. The Group Works Council and the Group Spokesperson Committee do not have an independent right to file a motion. Court costs are generally borne by the company; out-of-court costs, in particular the applicants’ attorneys’ fees, are not reimbursed.
In practice, this has led to a lack of enforcement. Although § 97(1) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) requires the Executive Board to initiate the status proceedings without delay if the composition of the Supervisory Board no longer complies with statutory requirements, this obligation was frequently ignored due to the lack of effective sanctions, and initiatives by employee representatives in large companies often failed simply because of the requirement for 100 petitioners.
2. What the Draft Bill Provides
- Lowering the quorum: The employee quorum is reduced from one-tenth or 100 to one-tenth or just three employees.
- Unions: The right to file a motion already exists if the union is represented in the company; a statutory right to make proposals is no longer required.
- Group-level bodies: The group works council and the group spokesperson committee will be authorized to file motions under certain circumstances.
- Cost allocation: If the executive board has culpably or in breach of duty failed to initiate status proceedings, the company shall also bear the out-of-court costs—in particular, attorneys’ fees—of the other parties involved.
3. Assessment
Largely neutral under European law. The composition of the supervisory board is governed by national co-determination law (MitbestG, DrittelbG), which—as the European Court of Justice confirmed in the Erzberger case (C-566/15)—remains fundamentally unaffected by EU law.
Effective elimination of the enforcement gap. Lowering the quorum significantly strengthens the procedural enforcement options available to minority shareholders. The group works council’s right to file a motion closes a significant gap: The relevant thresholds are typically calculated at the top management level of the group, where a local works council often does not exist. Above all, however, the cost provision serves to steer behavior: It eliminates the risk of litigation costs for employees, shifts economic incentives away from delaying tactics, and compels executive boards to fulfill their duty to take the initiative under Section 97(1) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) without delay.
This is not without controversy from a legal policy perspective. Within the legal framework, however, the changes are significant. Lowering the threshold to three employees effectively allows for individual petitions; extending the provision to unions without the right to make proposals and to corporate bodies undermines the filtering function of Section 98(2) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), which deliberately tied the right to file petitions to representativeness. Furthermore, the cost provisions unilaterally shift the cost risk to the corporation. It will need to be examined whether the very low threshold still corresponds to a genuine collective interest and whether the cost provisions are compatible with the principle that costs are borne by the prevailing party.
Conclusion
The draft bill aims to close two well-known loopholes: the freezing of SE structures exempt from co-determination through provisional incorporations and the hurdles of the status procedure under Section 98 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG). The reform of the status procedure is unobjectionable under EU law and is likely to effectively eliminate the enforcement deficit, but remains controversial from a legal policy perspective. The regulation of standby SEs, on the other hand, conflicts with the ECJ’s Olympus case law: The proposed presumptions extend the prohibition on abuse under § 43 of the SE Act (SEBG) beyond the scope covered by Article 11 of the SE Directive and replace the principle of static preservation of acquired rights with a dynamic obligation to rectify. Without a corresponding amendment to the SE Directive, this part of the proposal is likely to be vulnerable to challenge under European law and further diminish the attractiveness of the SE as a supranational legal form. Companies with reserve SE structures should therefore closely monitor the ongoing legislative process.
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